Debunking the Myths: International Commercial Arbitration and Section 1782(a) by Cuenca, Alejandro A. Nava
Note
Debunking the Myths:
International Commercial Arbitration and
Section 1782(a)
Alejandro A. Nava Cuenca†
I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................155
II. THEMYTH OF STATE-SPONSORED TRIBUNALS ..........................................................................158
A. A Brief History of Section 1782(a)................................................................................159
B. NBC’s Crucial Mistake..................................................................................................160
1. Lack of Reference to Private Arbitration in Congressional Reports ..................161
2. The Phrase “International Tribunal” in Section 270 ..........................................166
III. THEMYTH OF EFFICIENCY.........................................................................................................169
IV. THEMYTH OF AMBIGUITY .........................................................................................................173
V. MAKING SENSE OF THE POST-INTEL CHAOS ...............................................................................179
A. The Supreme Court Decision in Intel ............................................................................179
B. Categorizing Post-Intel Decisions..................................................................................181
1. Section 1782(a) Applies to International Commercial Arbitration.....................182
a. Section 1782(a) Categorically Includes Private Arbitral Bodies ............182
b. Private Arbitral Bodies Act like a “Tribunal” ........................................183
2. Section 1782(a) Does Not Apply to International Commercial Arbitration .......188
a. Section 1782(a) Categorically Excludes Private Arbitration..................188
b. Private Arbitral Bodies Do Not Act like a “Tribunal”............................189
VI. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................190
I. INTRODUCTION
International commercial arbitration continues to be the preferred dispute
resolution mechanism for cross-border commercial disputes.1 Its popularity
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editorial staff at the Yale Journal of International Law, especially Anya Corke Allen and David Moon, for
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writing of this Note.
1. See WHITE & CASE LLP & QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON, 2018 INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5 (2018),
https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmul-international-
arbitration-survey-2018-19.pdf (showing 92% of in-house counsel reported international arbitration as
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resides not only in the allure of efficient and flexible proceedings, but in the
prospect of having highly qualified and reputable experts decide cases without
the danger of national biases.2 Despite it being a private method of dispute
resolution, international arbitration ultimately relies on an intergovernmental
legal framework that allows enforcement of arbitral awards in over 150 countries
in the world.3 Yet, arbitrators are constrained in their search for truth; they lack
the coercive power to compel parties and non-parties to produce evidence that
may be crucial to the outcome of the proceedings.4
At first glance, it would appear as if the United States Code provides a
simple answer to this problem. Section 1782(a) of title 28 allows courts to
compel production of testimony and documents “for use in a proceeding before
a foreign or international tribunal.”5 Congress enacted the statute to provide
evidence-gathering assistance in federal courts to participants in international
adjudicative proceedings and to encourage foreign countries to provide similar
aid to proceedings in the United States.6 But it has been an uphill battle for those
who have sought judicial assistance in international commercial arbitrations
under section 1782(a). For the last three decades, courts have grappled with the
question of whether private arbitral bodies qualify as a “foreign or international
tribunal” under the statute.7 The result has been an amorphous body of law and
a circuit split that only promises to widen.
In 1999, the Second Circuit was the first court of appeals to tackle the issue
in National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC).8 In concluding that
private arbitral authorities are not tribunals under section 1782(a),9 the court
issued three key holdings. First, it held that the word “tribunal” is ambiguous,
which in turn drove the court to examine the legislative history in search of
Congress’s intent at the time of the statute’s enactment.10 Second, according to
the court’s interpretation of the congressional reports, section 1782(a) only
applies to State-sponsored or governmental entities.11 Finally, the court
concluded that evidence-gathering assistance in federal courts would hinder the
efficiency of arbitration proceedings.12 NBC was a precedent-setting opinion—
in the past twenty years, most of the courts that excluded private arbitration from
the scope of section 1782(a) have substantially replicated NBC’s reasoning,
preferred method of dispute resolution in 2018).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention];
Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION (last visited Dec. 18, 2020),
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states.
4. See Hans Smit, American Judicial Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals, 8 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 153, 160 (1997) [hereinafter Smit, American Judicial Assistance].
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018).
6. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 252 (2004).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). To the author’s knowledge, the first time a district court addressed this
issue was in 1994. See In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
8. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999).
9. Id. at 191.
10. Id. at 188.
11. Id. at 189–90.
12. Id. at 190–91.
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starting with the Fifth Circuit’s 1999 decision in Republic of Kazakhstan. v.
Biedermann International.13
Section 1782(a)’s landscape took an unexpected turn in 2004 with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.14 The
Court held that a European Union quasi-judicial administrative agency was a
“tribunal” under the statute because it acted like a “first-instance
decisionmaker.”15 Following Intel, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in
Biedermann in 2009, reasoning that the Court’s decision did not affect its prior
analysis because Intel concerned a governmental entity rather than a private
arbitral body.16 Other courts of appeals, however, reached a different conclusion.
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to include
international commercial arbitration within the scope of section 1782(a).
Applying Intel’s functional approach, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that an
arbitral authority is the functional equivalent of a “tribunal” for the purposes of
the statute.17 Unfortunately, the opinion was later vacated on other grounds,18
taking away the momentum needed for the Supreme Court to address the issue.
Now the tide has turned and the split has officially reached the circuit courts. On
the one hand, the Sixth Circuit in 2019 and the Fourth Circuit in 2020 held that
section 1782(a) applies to private arbitrations.19 On the other hand, in 2020 the
Seventh Circuit decided to exclude international commercial arbitration from the
scope of the statute and the Second Circuit reaffirmed the NBC holding.20 The
issue continues to draw attention from other courts of appeals as of the date of
this Note’s publication, with cases pending in the Third and Ninth Circuits21 and
a petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court.22
Navigating the muddy waters of section 1782(a) has led practitioners and
courts to spend tremendous amounts of time, energy, and resources—even in
circuits where the matter appeared to be settled.23 As long as globalized
13. Republic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int’l,168 F.3d 880, 881–83 (5th Cir. 1999).
14. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
15. Id. at 246, 257–58.
16. El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva del Rio Lempa, 341 F. App’x 31, 34 (5th Cir. 2009).
17. Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc.
(Consorcio I), 685 F.3d 987, 993–98 (11th Cir. 2012) vacated Consorcio Ecuatoriano de
Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc. (Consorcio II), 747 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014).
18. See Consorcio II, 747 F.3d at 1270 n.4 (expressly rejecting to consider the question because
the record did not contain sufficient information on the nature of the arbitral tribunal in question).
19. Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2020); Abdul Latif Jameel
Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019).
20. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 2020); Hanwei Guo v.
Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2020).
21. HRC-Hainan Holding Co. v. Yihan Hu, No. 20-15371 (9th Cir. argued Sep. 14, 2020); In
re EWG Gasspeicher GmbH, No. 19-mc-109-RGA, 2020 WL 1272612, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 17, 2020)
appeal docketed, No. 20-1830 (3d Cir. Apr. 24, 2020).
22. Servotronics, Inc., 975 F.3d 689 petition for cert. docketed, No. 20-794 (U.S. Dec. 11,
2020).
23. Before the Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in NBC,Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d at 100, two
courts in the Southern District of New York extended section 1728(a) to private arbitrations, reasoning
that Intel had materially impacted NBC’s holding. In re Children’s Invest. Fund Found. (UK), 363 F.
Supp. 3d 361, 370–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); In re Kleimar N.V., 220 F. Supp. 3d 517, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y.
2016).
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commerce keeps expanding, section 1782(a) applications will continue to flood
the courts, and the unnecessary expenditure of resources will persist. This
confusing state of affairs increases the likelihood that the issue reaches the
Supreme Court in upcoming terms. The stakes are high: given that American
corporations dominate global commerce and often play an important role as
parties and third parties to arbitration disputes, a Supreme Court decision on the
matter has the potential to shape international commercial arbitration on a
worldwide scale.
This Note will make the case for interpreting section 1782(a) as applicable
to international commercial arbitration. In tracking the conflicting interpretations
that have prevented section 1782(a)’s uniform application, this Note concludes
that the root of the confusion lies in the Second Circuit’s erroneous decision in
NBC. The Note will highlight crucial flaws in theNBC opinion, which have gone
under the radar for twenty-one years and have perpetuated myths that continue
to be replicated today.
Part II of this Note focuses on the myth of State-sponsored tribunals; it
argues that the idea that section 1782(a) only applies to State-sponsored bodies
was a fictional limitation created by the Second Circuit due to its
misinterpretation of the statute’s legislative history. Part III addresses the myth
of efficiency; it explains that some courts have overvalued the marginal impact
of evidence-gathering assistance in federal courts on the efficiency of arbitration
proceedings––in part because they have confused the policies underlying
domestic arbitration with those underlying international commercial arbitration.
Part IV confronts the myth of ambiguity; it criticizes NBC’s threshold finding
that the word “tribunal” in section 1782(a) is ambiguous and places particular
emphasis on NBC’s misinterpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.24 This Part will track the Sixth Circuit’s detailed
textual analysis, which concluded that the word “tribunal” unambiguously
includes private arbitration. Finally, Part V addresses the Supreme Court’s
decision in Intel and its subsequent impact on lower courts; it attempts to bring
order to the chaos by categorizing over thirty-five circuit and district court
decisions according to their rationales, breaking down their interpretations of
Intel.
II. THEMYTH OF STATE-SPONSORED TRIBUNALS
Much has been written about the 150 years of congressional efforts aimed
at providing federal court assistance in international proceedings, which resulted
in section 1782.25 In 1999, the Second Circuit analyzed the statute’s legislative
history and concluded that Congress intended the provision to apply only to
government or State-sponsored tribunals.26 This Part will argue that the court
erred in interpreting the 1964 amendments to the statute because Congress never
intended to exclude private arbitrations from the scope of section 1782(a).
24. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
25. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004).
26. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 188–191 (2d Cir. 1999).
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A. A Brief History of Section 1782(a)
In an attempt to address the “unmatched intensification of international
intercourse” in the postwar era,27 Congress created the Commission on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure (“Commission”) in 1958.28 The
Commission solicited the aid of the Project on International Procedure of the
Columbia University School of Law to carry out the international component of
the statutory task29—Professor Hans Smit was the Commission’s director and
then-student Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the Commission’s associate director.30
In 1964, Congress enacted the Commission’s proposed bill without
amendment or objection31 and adopted the Commission’s “understanding of the
intent behind the legislation”32:
Until recently, the United States has not engaged itself fully in efforts to improve
practices of international cooperation in litigation. The steadily growing involvement
of the United States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in
litigation with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory
improvements and other devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation.
Enactment of the bill into law will constitute a major step in bringing the United
States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations
and thereby providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of
tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects.
It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its procedures
will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust their procedures.33
The Supreme Court in Intel referred to Congress’s intent behind the statute,
noting section 1782’s “twin aims of ‘providing efficient assistance to participants
in international litigation and encouraging foreign countries by example to
provide similar assistance to our courts.”34
The statute’s old version allowed for limited evidence-gathering assistance
to a “judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country.”35 Instead,
the new version eliminated the word “judicial,” replaced the word “court” with
“tribunal,” and added the word “international.”36 Additionally, the new version
repealed and replaced sections 270 through 270(g) of title 22 of the United States
27. Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015,
1015 (1965) [hereinafter Smit, International Litigation].
28. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743, 1743 (authorizing the
Commission to “study existing practices of judicial assistance and cooperation between the United States
and foreign countries” with a special focus on rendering “more readily ascertainable, efficient,
economical, and expeditious” the “procedures of our State and Federal tribunals for the rendering of
assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial agencies . . . .”).
29. Smit, International Litigation, supra note 27, at 1015.
30. Smit, American Judicial Assistance, supra note 4, at 154.
31. Smit, International Litigation, supra note 27, at 1015.
32. Malev Hung. Airlines v. United Tech. Int’l Inc., Pratt &Whitney Commercial Engine Bus.,
964 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1992).
33. S.REP. NO. 88-1580, at 2 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3782–83; H.R.REP.
NO. 88-1052, at 4 (1963).
34. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 252 (2004) (quoting Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 2002)).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1958), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1996).
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Code (collectively, “section 270”)37—a discovery-enabling statute that,
according to Congress, limited assistance to international tribunals in an
“undesirable” way.38 The relevant portion of the revised section 1782(a) now
reads:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him
to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in
a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations
conducted before formal accusation.39
The most hotly debated portion of the congressional reports involves Congress’s
explanation of its choice of the word “tribunal,” which lies at the root of the
circuit split:
Subsection (a) of proposed revised section 1782 also describes the foreign
proceedings in connection with which U.S. judicial assistance may be granted. A
rather large number of requests for assistance emanate from investigating
magistrates. The word “tribunal” is used to make it clear that assistance is not
confined to proceedings before conventional courts. For example, it is intended that
the court have discretion to grant assistance when proceedings are pending before
investigating magistrates in foreign countries. In view of the constant growth of
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings all over the world, the necessity for
obtaining evidence in the United States may be as impelling in proceedings before a
foreign administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings before a
conventional foreign court. Subsection (a) therefore provides the possibility of U.S.
judicial assistance in connection with all such proceedings. Finally, the assistance
made available by subsection (a) is also extended to international tribunals and
litigants before such tribunals. The assistance thus made available replaces, and
eliminates the undesirable limitations of, the assistance extended by sections 270
through 270g of title 22, United States Code which are proposed to be repealed.40
B. NBC’s Crucial Mistake
The 1999 Second Circuit decision in NBC was the first to address the
meaning of the word “tribunal” in section 1782(a) as applied to international
commercial arbitration.41 This precedential opinion set the stage for a decades-
long quest to understand how private arbitration fits within section 1782’s
scheme.42After concluding that the term “tribunal” is ambiguous,43 the Second
Circuit analyzed the statute’s legislative history.44 NBC’s most consequential
holding was that Congress intended to provide judicial assistance only to State-
sponsored bodies, which excludes private arbitrations from the scope of the
37. Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 851, §§ 1–4, 46 Stat. 1005, 1005–06 (codified as 22 U.S.C. §§ 270–
270(c) (1958)) as amended by Act of June 7, 1933, ch. 50, §§ 5–8, 48 Stat. 117, 117–18 (codified as 22
U.S.C. §§ 270(d)–(g) (1958)) repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 3, 78 Stat. 995, 995.
38. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 6.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
40. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7–8; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9. (citations omitted).
41. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999).
42. See infra Section V.B.2.
43. NBC, 165 F.3d at 188. For a full discussion of the plain meaning of the term, see infra Part
IV.
44. NBC, 165 F.3d at 188–90.
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statute.45 In support of its holding, the Second Circuit advanced two reasons:
first, that the congressional reports discussed tribunals “acting as [S]tate
instrumentalities or with the authority of the [S]tate” and failed to reference
private arbitrations;46 and second, that the phrase “foreign or international
tribunal” in section 1782(a) was directly borrowed from repealed section
27047—a statute applicable to tribunals “established pursuant to an agreement
between the United States and any foreign government or governments . . . .”48
Both arguments, however, fail to find support in section 1782(a)’s legislative
history.
1. Lack of Reference to Private Arbitration in Congressional
Reports
In explaining the choice of the word “tribunal” in section 1782(a),
Congress stated that “[f]or example, it is intended that the court have discretion
to grant assistance when proceedings are pending before investigating
magistrates in foreign countries.”49 Congress also specified that “the necessity
for obtaining evidence in the United States may be as impelling in proceedings
before a foreign administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in
proceedings before a conventional foreign court.”50 The Second Circuit quoted
these two portions of the reports as the basis for its conclusion that “[t]he absence
of any reference to private dispute resolution proceedings such as arbitration
strongly suggests that Congress did not consider them in drafting the statute.”51
But beyond its reliance on congressional silence, the court never explained why
the State-sponsored or private nature of tribunals has any bearing on the purpose
of section 1782(a). As will be explained below, Congress sought to extend
judicial assistance to impartial adjudicative authorities that act like a “tribunal,”
which means that NBC’s focus on the body’s source of authority rather than its
functions was misplaced. The widespread confusion among courts on this issue
calls for a detailed analysis of the distinction between the two.
A public grant of jurisdiction to national courts and first generation
international tribunals is a “quintessentially sovereign act[]” through which
States authorize entities to administer justice in their name.52 In contrast, a
private grant of jurisdiction finds its source in consenting parties who authorize
45. Id. at 189–90 (“[I]t is apparent in context that the authors of [the congressional] reports had
in mind only governmental entities, such as administrative or investigative courts, acting as [S]tate
instrumentalities or with the authority of the [S]tate.”).
46. Id. at 189.
47. Id. at 189–90.
48. Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 851, § 1, 46 Stat. 1005, 1005 (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 270 (1958))
repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 3, 78 Stat. 995, 995.
49. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788; H.R. REP.
NO. 88-1052, at 9 (1963).
50. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 8; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9.
51. NBC, 165 F.3d at 189.
52. S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782: Distinguishing International Commercial
Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 324 (2013)
[hereinafter Strong, Distinguishing Commercial and Investment Arbitration].
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a third party to resolve a dispute.53 Although arbitration originates from the
consent of private parties, it is not an independent system of justice isolated from
governmental oversight.54 The goal of arbitration is to produce an award
enforceable under the authority of the State. Without the backing of conventional
courts, arbitration would not achieve its purpose of being an efficient dispute
resolution mechanism.55 Insofar as international commercial arbitration depends
on State authority to enforce awards, it exists within a State-sponsored
framework built on domestic laws and international treaties such as the New
York Convention.56
The most important difference between a public and a private grant of
jurisdiction is that, in the case of public grants, “[the] judicial power is a power
that is exercised independently of the consent of the person against whom the
proceedings are brought and results in a judgment or order that is binding of its
own force.”57 This distinction, in turn, gives rise to functional and procedural
differences between conventional litigation and arbitration. Examples of these
differences include (a) arbitration parties’ right to choose an arbitrator as
opposed to elected or appointed judges; (b) arbitration’s simpler procedural rules
amenable to amendment by the parties as opposed to litigation’s complex set of
pre-existing set of rules; (c) arbitration’s confidential proceedings as opposed to
litigation’s publicly available records; or (d) arbitral awards’ limited judicial
review as opposed to review of court judgments on the merits.58 It is crucial,
however, that the grant of jurisdiction to the adjudicative body is not confused
with its functions or procedural characteristics. In other words, it is possible—
albeit unlikely—for parties to structure an arbitration in a way that mimics
regular litigation (e.g., by using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing
disclosure of the record, or providing for review of the award on the merits by a
higher arbitral panel). But even in that case, the source of authority of an arbitral
body will always be different from that of a court—in litigation, the power to
impart justice lies with the State, while in arbitration it lies with a privately
appointed third party.
Despite their differences, litigation and arbitration are functional
equivalents; that is, they are both adjudicatory mechanisms conducted by a
neutral decisionmaker, where parties with basic due process guarantees present
53. Id. at 338.
54. See Halil Rahman Basaran, Is International Arbitration Universal?, 21 ILSA J. INTL. &
COMP. L. 497, 499 (2015) (“It is thanks to [S]tate consent that international commercial arbitration exists
in the first place. This is the public law aspect of international commercial arbitration.”).
55. 31 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 495 (1995) (“The most carefully drafted international
arbitration agreement is worthless if an award stemming from that agreement cannot be enforced . . . .”).
56. See In re Hanwei Guo, No. 18-MC-561 (JMF), 2019 WL 917076, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
2019), aff’d sub nom. Hanwei Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2020) (“After all,
even the most ‘private’ of arbitrations are commonly backed up by the prospect of review, and
enforcement, in governmental courts.”).
57. Strong, Distinguishing Commercial and Investment Arbitration, supra note 52, at 325
(quoting TCL Air Conditioner Co. v. Fed. Court of Austl., HCA 51 ¶ 23 (2013)).
58. See S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between International Commercial Arbitration and
U.S. Federal Courts: A Jurisprudential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 126 (2012) [hereinafter Strong,
Navigating the Borders].
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evidence in proceedings that result in a judgment or award enforceable in
national courts. This functional equivalence is the reason why Congress enacted
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1929,59 which elevated arbitration as a
“favored alternative to litigation when the parties agree in writing to
arbitration.”60
NBC stands for the proposition that Congress did not intend private
arbitration to be within the scope of section 1782(a) because the arbitrators’
source of jurisdiction is a private agreement.61 As explained above, the
difference between a public and a private grant of jurisdiction boils down to the
State’s power to compel parties into a judicial proceeding and to issue a judgment
enforceable in and of itself—as opposed to consensual proceedings that result in
awards that depend on external means of enforcement. For purposes of section
1782(a), this distinction bears weight only if Congress finds value in preserving
the monopoly of foreign countries over their justice systems. In other words, if
the source of authority of the tribunal—as opposed to its function—truly matters
under the statute, then Congress would have withheld judicial assistance from
international arbitrations because it did not trust the ability of private parties to
resolve their own disputes (not only because arbitration functions differently
from courts but because the decision-making power rests in the hands of private
parties as opposed to the State). Nevertheless, the creation of State-sponsored
international and domestic frameworks does away with the due process concerns
that underlie the desire to impose governmental surveillance over arbitrations.
Most importantly, the enactment of the FAAmade it clear that Congress not only
fully endorsed arbitration but, in many instances, considered it to be a “favored
alternative to litigation . . . .”62 Thus, the Second Circuit’s crucial mistake lies in
its misplaced emphasis on the tribunal’s grant of jurisdiction.
Contrary to the holding in NBC, the legislative history of section 1782(a)
better supports the position that Congress was not concerned with a tribunal’s
source of authority but with its function. The congressional reports acknowledge
that the statute’s prior version was too narrow because it was limited to
conventional courts.63 In choosing to eliminate the word “court” and replace it
with “tribunal,” Congress intended to liberalize judicial assistance in
international proceedings.64 Indeed, the drafter of the statute, Professor Hans
59. Congress enacted the FAA to “create[] a body of federal substantive law establishing and
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate . . . .” Moses H. Cone Mem’l. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). “The FAA was one of the first modern arbitration statutes, and
its enactment attested to the coming-of-age of arbitration in the United States.” Thomas E. Carbonneau,
The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 268 (1988).
60. McCormick v. Am. Online, Inc., 909 F.3d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 2018) (citingMoses, 460 U.S.
at 24).
61. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 189–90 (2d Cir. 1999).
62. McCormick, 909 F.3d at 680; see also supra note 59.
63. “The word ‘tribunal’ is used to make it clear that assistance is not confined to proceedings
before conventional courts.” S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782,
3788; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9 (1963).
64. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9 (“The proposed revision of section
1782, set forth in section 9(a) clarifies and liberalizes existing U.S. procedures for assisting foreign and
international tribunals and litigants . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Smit, staunchly advocated for an interpretation of section 1782(a) that would
include private arbitration. He stated that he chose the word “tribunal” because
it was a term broad enough “to make [s]ection 1782(a) assistance available on as
liberal and flexible a basis as possible in any proceedings before a body
exercising adjudicatory authority.”65 Therefore, the purpose of the amendment
was to provide courts with flexibility to adapt to the ever-changing and
increasingly globalized commerce and to provide assistance to a broader range
of international proceedings.
According to the Second Circuit, the fact that Congress listed only
governmental entities in its reports (i.e., investigating magistrates, foreign
administrative tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies) serves as conclusive
evidence that the statute only applies to State-sponsored bodies.66 Nothing
suggests, however, that Congress provided an exhaustive list of all “tribunal[s]”
in the reports; instead, the use of the phrase “for example” implies an intent to
avoid listing all possible adjudicatory bodies.67 Most importantly, the
congressional reports did not draw attention to how or why the source of the
tribunal’s authority would impact the ultimate purpose of liberalizing judicial
assistance. In contrast, Congress did emphasize that providing judicial assistance
would resolve “the necessity [of foreign bodies] for obtaining evidence in the
United States . . . .”68 The phrase “obtaining evidence” suggests that Congress’s
purpose was to assist adjudicatory tribunals with proof-gathering functions (i.e.,
bodies capable of acting like conventional courts).69
65. Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the Proper Interpretation of Section 1782: Its
Potential Significance for International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’LARB. 295, 301 (2003) [hereinafter
Smit, Supreme Court Rules]; see also Arthur W. Rovine, Section 1782 and International Arbitral
Tribunals: Some Key Considerations in Key Cases, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 461, 470 (2012) (“Hans said
publicly that if anyone wanted to know the legislative history and underlying intent of [section] 1782 they
had to come to him because he wrote [section] 1782, and it was his intention that the statute apply to
foreign and international arbitration tribunals.” (emphasis omitted)). The Second Circuit disregarded
Professor Smit’s views, reasoning that his perspective was “unpersuasive” because he first expressed it in
an article written in 1998 and that post-amendment writings should not be determinative of congressional
intent. NBC, 165 F.3d at 190 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, taking into account that “the post-
amendment writings are by the Reporter for the responsible legislative committee and his understanding
of the scope of the amendments is consistent with the general thrust of the Supreme Court’s expansive
interpretation of those amendments,” Professor Smit’s comments should be considered persuasive. In re
Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956 n.2 (D. Minn. 2007). In fact, the Supreme Court in Intel
relied on Professor Smit’s 1998 article—the same article that the Second Circuit disregarded—to support
its interpretation of section 1782(a). See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 262
n.13, 265 n.17 (2004) (citing Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International
Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COMM. 1, 13, 19–
20 (1998)) [hereinafter Smit, American Assistance to Litigation]. Regardless of whether Professor Smit’s
post-amendment comments are attributable to Congress or not, his views are being cited here for the
persuasiveness of their substance.
66. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 189–90.
67. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9 (“For example, it is intended
that the court have discretion to grant assistance when proceedings are pending before investigating
magistrates in foreign countries.”).
68. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 8; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9. Although the reports mention the
need of a “foreign administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency” to obtain evidence, the fact that this
sentence only refers to State-sponsored bodies seems to be irrelevant. As explained above, it is likely that
these were only examples to illustrate the breadth of the word “tribunal” rather than an attempt to limit
the scope of the statute. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 8; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9.
69. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 8; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9.
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The Supreme Court confirmed Congress’s functional understanding of
section 1782(a). As explained in detail in Part V, the IntelCourt held that a quasi-
judicial administrative body was within the scope of the statute because it acted
like a tribunal—an adjudicatory body capable of gathering evidence and entering
a reviewable decision.70 The Court further noted that “[i]n light of the variety of
foreign proceedings resistant to ready classification in domestic terms, Congress
left unbounded by categorical rules the determination whether a matter is
proceeding ‘in a foreign or international tribunal.’”71 The phrase “resistant to
ready classification” is best interpreted to refer to the myriad of functionally
different proceedings around the world, rather than to the tribunal’s source of
authority.72
Some lower courts have argued that Intel’s rationale does not apply to
private arbitrations because the Supreme Court did not examine tribunals for
which parties privately contracted.73 Yet, the idea that the Court’s reasoning
would have changed if the tribunal’s source of authority was a private grant of
jurisdiction finds no support in the opinion.74 The fact that the quasi-judicial
administrative body in Intel was government-sponsored was irrelevant to its
function as an impartial adjudicative entity.75
Thus, the legislative history of section 1782(a) and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Intel support the conclusion that Congress was concerned with the
function of a tribunal rather than the source of its authority. The larger question
must then be whether the tasks performed by arbitrators fail to align with those
performed by the adjudicative bodies to which Congress intended to extend
judicial assistance. The answer must be no. When Congress enacted section
1782(a), it attempted to extend assistance to the growing number of international
proceedings in the post-war era.76 In doing so, Congress sought to render the
United States a pioneer of international cooperation to facilitate efficient
evidence gathering around the world77—not only in courts but in any other
proceeding that resembled conventional litigation in a functional sense. As a
favored alternative to litigation,78 arbitration is exactly the type of proceeding
that Congress envisioned should receive aid from federal courts. Just like the
quasi-judicial administrative body in Intel, arbitrators adjudicate disputes, have
an obligation to impartially apply the law to the facts, gather and weigh evidence,
70. The entity at issue in Intel was the Commission of the European Communities (“EU
Commission”), the European body charged with conducting antitrust proceedings. 542 U.S. at 250. After
noting that the EU Commission was a “proof-taking” body in which petitioner could “use” evidence, the
Court held that it had “no warrant to exclude the European Commission, to the extent that it acts as a first-
instance decisionmaker, from [section] 1782(a)’s ambit.” Id. at 257–58.
71. Id. at 263 n.15.
72. See id.
73. See infra Section V.B.2.a.
74. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 257–58.
75. See id.
76. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
77. See supra Section II.A.
78. McCormick v. Am. Online, Inc., 909 F.3d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem’l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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and are first-instance decisionmakers.79
It is probably correct to assume that Congress did not have the “then-novel
arena of international commercial arbitration” in mind when it enacted section
1782(a).80 As the Second Circuit heavily emphasized, this is likely the reason
why Congress failed to mention private dispute resolution proceedings in its
reports.81 Nonetheless, Congress’s silence does not warrant the conclusion that
it intended to exclude private arbitration from the scope of the statute. As the
Supreme Court noted, “Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in
discerning the proper statutory route”;82 this is so because “a court cannot, in the
manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark.”83
As such, congressional intent should be found in the statute’s overarching
purpose: that is, the reports’ statement that “[t]he word ‘tribunal’ is used to make
it clear that assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional
courts.”84 This is the critical portion of the congressional reports because it
confirms that the only thing that is certain is that Congress intended to expand
section 1782(a), which does not mean that the “expansion stopped short of
private arbitration.”85
2. The Phrase “International Tribunal” in Section 270
Repealed section 270 had an even more important role in the Second
Circuit’s holding.86 According to the court, Congress borrowed the phrase
“international or foreign tribunal” in section 1782(a) from repealed section 270,
which applied only to intergovernmental tribunals.87 Just as with the
congressional reports, the Second Circuit’s conclusion regarding section 270
stemmed from its misinterpretation of the statute’s legislative history.
Section 270 was a statute designed to allow domestic courts to compel the
79. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 257–58.
80. SeeRepublic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1999); see alsoDaniel
J. Rothstein, A Proposal to Clarify U.S. Law on Judicial Assistance in Taking Evidence for International
Arbitration, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 61, 70 (2008) (evaluating the state of international arbitration law
in 1964 and concluding that private arbitration was not on the agenda of the drafters of section 1782).
81. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1999).
82. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969).
83. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980). The Supreme Court’s position
comes in stark contrast to NBC, where the Second Circuit noted that “[t]he legislative history’s silence
with respect to private tribunals is especially telling because we are confident that a significant
congressional expansion of American judicial assistance to international arbitral panels created
exclusively by private parties would not have been lightly undertaken by Congress without at least a
mention of this legislative intention.” NBC, 165 F.3d at 190. NBC’s reasoning also conflicts with the
arguments furthered by the Fifth Circuit—if international commercial arbitration was so novel and small
in 1964 that Congress did not contemplate it when enacting the statute, Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 882, then
extending section 1782(a) to cover it would not have been “a significant congressional expansion” that
Congress could not have “lightly undertaken.” See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190.
84. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788; H.R. REP.
NO. 88-1052, at 9 (1963).
85. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710, 728 (6th Cir. 2019).
86. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 189 (“The legislative history behind the replacement of [sections]
270-270g is even more compelling than that behind the revisions to the old [section] 1782.”).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 94–99.
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testimony of witnesses in international proceedings.88 While drafting section
1782, Professor Smit wrote an article in 1962 urging Congress to repeal section
270 due to its undesirable limitations, two of which have special relevance
here.89 First, section 270 only applied to proceedings involving the United States
or its nationals.90 Second, the proceedings were restricted to claims pending
before “an international tribunal or commission, established pursuant to an
agreement between the United States and any foreign government or
governments . . . .”91 Professor Smit recommended that section 270 be made
available to all proceedings before international tribunals.92 Congress followed
the proposed recommendations and repealed section 270:
The main drawback of these provisions is that they improperly limit the availability
of assistance to the U.S. agent before an international tribunal and require that the
evidence relate to a matter in which the United States or any of its nationals is
involved. Clearly, the interest of the United States in peaceful settlement of
international disputes is not limited to controversies to which it is a formal party.
Furthermore, it is only appropriate that the United States make the same assistance
available to litigants before international tribunals that, in section 1782 of title 28,
United States Code, it makes available to litigants before foreign tribunals.93
Interpreting this section of the congressional report, the Second Circuit held that
the term “international tribunal” in section 1782(a) “derives directly” from
section 270.94 According to the court, “[i]t is clear that the 1964 legislation was
intended to broaden the scope of the repealed 22 U.S.C. §§ 270–270g by
extending the reach of the surviving statute to intergovernmental tribunals not
involving the United States.”95 But if Congress understood section 270 to be too
limited in scope and repealed it precisely to liberalize judicial assistance, it does
not follow that it would have borrowed section 270’s narrow meaning of the
word “tribunal” for the new and more expansive section 1782.96 Furthermore, if
the word “tribunal” in section 1782(a) were truly imported from section 270, the
meaning should have been borrowed in its entirety, including the requirement
that the tribunal be established pursuant to a treaty with the United States, unless
88. Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 851, §§ 1–4, 46 Stat. 1005, 1005–06 as amended by Act of June 7,
1933, ch. 50, §§ 5–8, 48 Stat. 117, 117–18, repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 3, 78
Stat. 995, 995. In 1930, Congress enacted sections 270 through 270(c) “in direct response to problems
that arose in an arbitration proceeding between the United States and Canada.” NBC, 165 F.3d at 189
(citing Hans Smit, Assistance Rendered by the United States in Proceedings Before International
Tribunals, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1264, 1264 (1962) [hereinafter Smit, Assistance Rendered]). The statute
authorized “international tribunals” to “administer oaths, to subpoena witnesses and records, and to punish
for contempt.” Smit, Assistance Rendered, supra, at 1264. Three years later, in 1933, prompted by
evidence-gathering limitations concerning the United States-German Mixed Claims Commission,
Congress enacted sections 270(d) through 270(g), expanding access to federal courts for “the American
agent.” Id.
89. Smit, Assistance Rendered, supra note 88, at 1274.
90. Id. at 1266 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 270 (1958)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1269, 1276.
93. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 4 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3785; H.R. REP.
NO. 88-1052, at 6 (1963).
94. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1999).
95. Id. at 190.
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018); 22 U.S.C. § 270 (1958).
168 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 46: 1
otherwise noted.97 The Second Circuit could not reach this conclusion because
Congress made it clear that the requirement was an “undesirable” limitation.98
The court instead chose the meaning that aligned with excluding private
arbitration from the scope of the statute; it disregarded the requirement in the
repealed section that the United States had to be a party to an agreement but
somehow managed to keep the “intergovernmental” requirement for tribunals.99
There is nothing in section 1782(a)’s legislative history that indicates that
the term “international tribunal” was directly borrowed from section 270. In
explaining the use of the word “tribunal” in section 1782(a), Congress never
referred to the language in section 270;100 instead, it made sure to repeal that
statute so that section 1782(a) would be available to all participants before
proceedings in international tribunals.101 Moreover, if the word “tribunal” in
section 1782(a) had kept the “intergovernmental” feature, then conventional
foreign courts would have been excluded from the scope of the statute because
they do not derive their authority from an “intergovernmental” agreement, as
required by section 270.102 This would be an untenable assertion because section
1782(a) “is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts,” which
indicates that, at a minimum, it encompasses foreign courts.103
In another effort to validate its holding, the Second Circuit noted that
Congress cited Professor Smit’s 1962 article to explain the undesirable
limitations of section 270.104 In that article, Professor Smit asserted that “an
international tribunal owes both its existence and its powers to an international
agreement.”105 The court concluded that, since the drafter of section 1782(a) was
of the alleged view that international tribunals were only State-sponsored, and
since Congress had adopted Professor Smit’s account, his words further
supported the view that the term “tribunal” under section 1782 borrowed its
meaning from repealed section 270.106 This quotation, however, was taken out
of context. The relevant portion of Professor Smit’s article reads as follows:
Section 270 is also subject to criticism because it purports unilaterally to bestow
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018); 22 U.S.C. § 270 (1958).
98. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 6.
99. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190.
100. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 3–4; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 5–6.
101. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 3–4; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 5–6.
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018); 22 U.S.C. § 270 (1958).
103. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9.
104. NBC, 165 F.3d at 190 (quoting Smit, Assistance Rendered, supra note 88, at 1265).
105. Smit, Assistance Rendered, supra note 88, at 1267.
106. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190 (“The Senate Report, in referring to the undesirable limitations of
[sections] 270-270g, relied on a 1962 article by Professor Hans Smit, director of a project at the Columbia
University School of Law that aided the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure in
drafting the bill that included the amended [section] 1782. In that article, Professor Smit asserted that ‘an
international tribunal owes both its existence and its powers to an international agreement.’” (citations
omitted.)) Note that the Second Circuit did not only cite Professor Smit to gloss the meaning of the word
“tribunal” within the specific context of section 270. See id. There was no need for this because the text
of section 270 alreadymade it clear that the tribunals under that provision were limited to those established
pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement. See 22 U.S.C. § 270 (1958). Instead, the Second Circuit cited
Professor Smit’s article to support the proposition that Professor Smit himself thought that all tribunals—
not only those to which section 270 referred to—owed their existence to an international agreement. See
NBC, 165 F.3d at 190.
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power to administer oaths upon international tribunals established by bilateral or
multilateral agreement. There is little doubt that it can not effectively do so. Since an
international tribunal owes both its existence and its powers to an international
agreement, its powers can be extended only by such an agreement and not by a
unilateral act. The correctness of this view was sustained by the United States-
German Mixed Claims Commission when the American agent tried to invoke the
1930 act. Accordingly, section 270 is of avail only if the tribunal is willing to assert
powers not granted by international agreement and if all parties fail to object or
agree.107
It is evident from the quotation that Professor Smit addressed the meaning of
international tribunals in the exclusive context of section 270 because he was
referring to one of the flaws of the statute. Given that section 270 limited the
scope of the phrase “international tribunal” to those formed pursuant to bilateral
and multilateral agreements,108 a fairer reading of Professor Smit’s account
would be that the “international tribunal[s] [to which section 270 refers] owe[ ]
both [their] existence and [their] powers to an international agreement.”109
Placing the quotation in its proper context, it is clear that Professor Smit did not
make a general assertion that all international tribunals must be State-
sponsored—only those referred to in section 270.
Section 1782(a)’s congressional reports do not warrant the claim that
Congress excluded private arbitration from the scope of the statute or that the
term “international tribunal” in section 1782(a) was borrowed from repealed
section 270. When Congress sought to limit the breadth of the term in section
270 it did so in an express fashion by adding the requirement that the tribunals
be established pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement.110 Instead, Congress
chose not to limit the term in section 1782(a).111 NBC’s distinction between
State-sponsored and private tribunals does not find support in section 1782(a)’s
legislative history, and notably, it hinders the statute’s purpose of extending
judicial assistance to international adjudicatory proceedings.
III. THEMYTH OF EFFICIENCY
Courts and commentators have not shied away from exploring the policy
implications of providing assistance in federal courts to international commercial
arbitrations. The idea that wide-ranging discovery is at odds with arbitration has
been pervasive among those who have read section 1782(a) narrowly.112 Once
107. Smit, Assistance Rendered, supra note 88, at 1267.
108. 22 U.S.C. § 270.
109. Smit, Assistance Rendered, supra note 88, at 1267.
110. See 22 U.S.C. § 270.
111. See In reRoz Trading Ltd., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1226 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (“Had Congress
wanted to impose [a limitation on section 1782], it would have been a simple matter to add the word
‘governmental’ before the word ‘tribunal’ in the 1964 amendment.”).
112. See, e.g., El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa, 341 F.
App’x 31, 34 (5th Cir. 2009); Republic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999);
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 190–91 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Grupo Unidos
Por El Canal S.A., No. 14–mc–80277–JST (DMR), 2015 WL 1815251, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015);
In re Rhodianyl S.A.S, No. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *49 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2011).
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again, the first court to champion this view was the Second Circuit in NBC.113 It
reasoned that “[t]he popularity of arbitration rests in considerable part on its
asserted efficiency and cost-effectiveness,” and that discovery would conflict
with federal policy favoring arbitration by undermining these benefits.114 This
argument rests on the assumption that all arbitration proceedings—domestic and
international alike—are always cheaper, faster, and less burdensome from a
procedural standpoint.115
Proponents of this view tend to overvalue efficiency. Although quicker and
lower-cost proceedings are the main goal in domestic commercial arbitration,
that is not necessarily the case in international commercial arbitration. Instead,
there are important differences between both types of arbitration that render
efficiency concerns less compelling in the context of section 1782(a). As
explained by Professor S.I. Strong, international commercial arbitration involves
[s]ophisticated, specialized counsel for both parties (as opposed to consumer,
employment, and securities arbitration, which may proceed without counsel for one
or both of the parties);
. . .
Highly formal procedures, often dictated by detailed institutional rules of procedure
and requiring extensive pre- and post-hearing written submissions, and involving
days, if not weeks, of hearings (as opposed to consumer, labor, and employment
arbitration, which use very little in the way of written submissions and evidence, and
which emphasize short and informal hearings);
Complex legal claims involving large sums of money, often ranging in the millions
or billions of dollars (as opposed to consumer, labor, and employment arbitration,
which often involve simple legal issues and small amounts in dispute) . . . .116
To clarify, this is not to say that efficiency is not a norm relevant to international
arbitration proceedings. However, given that it can be slower, more expensive,
and more complex than domestic arbitration, parties often pursue international
arbitration for other reasons that, arguably, have equal or more weight than
efficiency concerns. Examples of such reasons include (a) a lower likelihood of
local prejudice from domestic courts;117 (b) a lower likelihood of entertaining
cases before corrupt judiciaries, especially in emerging economies;118 (c) highly
qualified arbitrators with extensive experience in international law and
113. NBC, 165 F.3d at 190–91.
114. Id.; see also Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Understanding Discovery in International
Commercial Arbitration Through Behavioral Law and Economics: A Journey Inside the Minds of Parties
and Arbitrators, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165, 172 (2011) (“[D]iscovery has traditionally been viewed
as an overly intrusive, time consuming, and expensive process that is susceptible to abuse by parties.”).
115. See, e.g., Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883 (“Arbitration is intended as a speedy, economical,
and effective means of dispute resolution. The course of the litigation before us suggests that arbitration’s
principal advantages may be destroyed if the parties succumb to fighting over burdensome discovery
requests far from the place of arbitration.”).
116. Strong, Navigating the Borders, supra note 58, at 125–26.
117. Id. at 126 (“[A]s opposed to international litigation, which can subject parties to bias (or
perceived bias) from national courts that favor their own citizens”).
118. See generally Edgardo Buscaglia, Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes
and Economic Consequences (Berkeley Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 28, 1999),
http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/28.
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commerce;119 (d) policies requiring arbitrators to disclose conflicts of interest;120
(e) limited judicial review, which translates into a faster route to a final award
and greater legal certainty;121 (f) effective and reliable means of enforcing
awards; (g) confidential proceedings; and (h) a blend of common law and civil
law procedures that renders disputes accessible to parties from all legal
backgrounds.122
The courts that have followed the NBC rationale have depicted efficiency
as the be-all and end-all goal of international arbitration, which reveals their
fundamental misunderstanding of its underlying policies. Indeed, it seems like
these courts overvalued speed and savings to such an extent that they forgot that
efficiency also rests on the need to achieve a just and factually accurate result.
Thus, they disregarded the negative impact that their rulings would have on the
ability of international arbitrators to gather the evidence they require to resolve
disputes. Even though arbitrators have limited devices to induce parties to
produce evidence—such as drawing negative inferences from the parties’ failure
to cooperate—they are wholly reliant on federal courts when facing
uncooperative non-parties in the United States.123 Although the NBC court held
that extending assistance to international arbitrators would cut against the federal
policy in favor of arbitration,124 nothing furthers this policy more than allowing
arbitrators to gather evidence that would otherwise be unavailable to them.125
The NBC decision portrays judicial assistance under section 1782(a) as an
unmanageable beast that would inevitably lead to a full-scale, multijurisdictional
dispute that would drag on arbitration proceedings indefinitely.126 Yet, the most
visible red flag in NBC’s efficiency argument is that the court never discussed
the broad discretionary powers that judges have under section 1782(a).127 In
reality, judges can—and should—act as gatekeepers precisely to prevent the kind
119. Strong, Navigating the Borders, supra note 58, at 126.
120. Id. at 125 (“[A]s opposed to labor and employment arbitration, which can experience
difficulties arising from perceptions regarding arbitrator bias concerning ‘repeat players’”).
121. Id. at 126.
122. Id. at 127.
123. Smit, American Judicial Assistance, supra note 4, at 160.
124. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 190–91 (2d Cir. 1999).
125. The Supreme Court has held that international commercial arbitration should be treated
more favorably than domestic arbitration, even if there is a contrary result in the domestic context.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (“[W]e conclude
that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context.”). Some authors have argued that the strong policy in favor of
international commercial arbitration should be enough in itself to read section 1782(a) broadly. SeeMartin
Illmer & Ben Steinbrück, U.S. Discovery and Foreign Private Arbitration: The Foreign Lawyer’s
Perspective, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 329, 333, 335 (2008); Smit, Supreme Court Rules, supra note 65, at 308
(“[The federal] policy alone is sufficient to justify reading [s]ection 1782 so as to provide what its plain
and clear terms signify and to extend [s]ection 1782 assistance to private arbitral tribunals created under
foreign or international law or agreements.”). But see Rothstein, supra note 80, at 61 (criticizing dynamic
statutory interpretation that takes “into account post-enactment developments that reflect a ‘pro-arbitration
policy’ . . . .”).
126. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190–91.
127. See id.
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of concerns raised in NBC.128 They must take several factors into account when
deciding whether to grant assistance to international tribunals, such as (a) the
nature of the foreign tribunal; (b) the character of the proceedings; (c) whether
the request is an attempt to circumvent foreign evidence-gathering restrictions;
and most importantly (d) whether the request is unduly intrusive or
burdensome.129 If a court decides to grant the application, it can limit the scope
of the assistance in a manner that promotes both efficiency and the search for
truth.130 A court’s power to shape its aid is so broad that it can deny an
application if the parties submit it without the prior approval of the arbitrator.131
As one commentator argued, nothing would be more paternalistic than a court
rejecting requests for evidence issued by private arbitrators themselves.132 If the
Second Circuit’s holding continues to stand, however, courts would not even
have the opportunity to exercise their discretion because they would be
categorically prohibited from considering arbitrators as a “tribunal” under
section 1782(a).133 Conversely, if courts exercise “scrupulous judicial
discretion,”134 extending assistance to international commercial arbitration
would enhance the federal policy in favor of arbitration without hindering its
efficiency. And even if there were marginal costs to efficiency, enabling
interested parties to procure critical evidence weighs in favor of reading section
1782(a) broadly.
The Second Circuit, and most recently the Seventh Circuit, raised a final
concern if federal courts were to provide evidence-gathering assistance in
international commercial arbitrations.135 Section 7 of the FAA allows arbitrators
in the United States to request federal district courts to compel discovery in
limited circumstances, which, according to the court, would potentially conflict
with section 1782(a)’s more extensive assistance to international tribunals.136
128. Section 1782(a) “leaves the issuance of an appropriate order to the discretion of the court
which, in proper cases, may refuse to issue an order or may impose conditions it deems desirable.” S. REP.
NO. 88-1580, at 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9
(1963).
129. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264–65 (2004). Note that a
court may exercise its discretion only after having determined that it has the authority to do so. As such,
the statutory requirement that the proceedings be before a foreign or international tribunal in the first step
of the inquiry must be distinguished from an analysis of the nature of the tribunal in the second step of the
inquiry. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710, 725 (6th Cir. 2019).
130. See ALJ, 939 F.3d at 730 (“FedEx Corp.’s argument seems to assume that [section] 1782(a)
discovery requests will inevitably become unduly burdensome, but the Supreme Court has made clear that
district courts enjoy substantial discretion to shape discovery under [section] 1782(a).”); Okezie
Chukwumerije, International Judicial Assistance: Revitalizing Section 1782, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 649, 653 (2005) (“[Courts] can exercise this discretion in a way that promotes the goals of efficient
and speedy conduct of arbitration proceedings.”).
131. See In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying section
1782(a) application because the arbitrator did not provide prior approval); see also Chukwumerije, supra
note 130, at 679.
132. See Rothstein, supra note 80, at 61.
133. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999).
134. Chukwumerije, supra note 130, at 653.
135. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 695–96 (7th Cir. 2020); NBC, 165
F.3d at 187–88, 191.
136. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 187–88, 191 (listing the differences between both statutes and finding
that extending section 1782(a) to private arbitration “would create an entirely new category of disputes
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The Supreme Court, however, has already rejected similar claims in the broader
context of section 1782:
We also reject Intel’s suggestion that a [section] 1782(a) applicant must show that
United States law would allow discovery in domestic litigation analogous to the
foreign proceedings. Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to tribunals abroad.
It does not direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine
whether analogous proceedings exist here.137
As Professor Smit correctly argued, NBC’s reasoning “stands the very purpose
of [s]ection 1782 on its head. It seeks to limit [s]ection 1782 because the
domestic lawmaker has fallen short in introducing the same desirable rules into
its domestic system. It frustrates, rather than effectuates, the legislative
purpose.”138 The Supreme Court has also indicated that the strong federal policy
in favor of international commercial arbitration should be advanced “even
assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.”139
Commentators have further argued that section 1782(a)’s liberal provisions
should induce the legislature to reform domestic law and emulate the
amendments achieved on the international level—it should not be a “justification
for a strained interpretation of the plain language of section 1782.”140 Indeed, as
will be addressed in Part IV, the plain language of the statute also supports the
conclusion that international arbitrations are “tribunal[s]” under section 1782(a).
IV. THEMYTH OF AMBIGUITY
The relevant portion of section 1782(a) states:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him
to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in
a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations
conducted before formal accusation.141
In interpreting the provision, courts have attempted to find the ordinary and
common meaning of the phrase “foreign or international tribunal.”142 Faithful to
the pattern highlighted throughout this Note, the NBC decision was
consequential in this regard and cleared the way for other circuit and district
courts to exclude private arbitration from the scope of section 1782(a).143 The
Second Circuit held that the phrase is ambiguous and resorted to the legislative
history to explore congressional intent.144 Nevertheless, in reaching that
conclusion, the court bypassed a crucial step of statutory interpretation by failing
to analyze the specific and broader context of section 1782(a). This led the court
concerning the appointment of arbitrators and the characterization of arbitral panels as domestic, foreign,
or international.”).
137. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 263 (2004) (citations omitted).
138. Smit, Supreme Court Rules, supra note 65, at 311.
139. SeeMitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
140. Chukwumerije, supra note 130, at 678; see also Smit, American Judicial Assistance, supra
note 4, at 160.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
142. See id.
143. See cases that replicated NBC’s reasoning cited infra Section V.B.2.
144. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999).
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to explore extra-textual sources in a premature fashion. Instead, the inquiry
should have ended with the text of the statute, which unambiguously includes
private arbitral bodies. This Part explores some of the flaws in the Second
Circuit’s rationale in light of the recent decisions by the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits145—the only courts of appeals to engage in a meaningful textual analysis
of section 1782(a).146
Title 28 of the United States Code does not define the phrase “foreign or
international tribunal.”147 To determine the meaning of the phrase, settled
precedent requires a three-step inquiry: first, courts must analyze the relevant
language of the section itself; next, they must look at the specific context in
which that language is used; and finally, they must evaluate the broader context
and structure of the statute as a whole.148 The unmistakable international nature
of the arbitration proceedings in most cases has allowed the courts to dodge the
otherwise thorny issue of defining the meaning of the words “foreign or
international.”149 Thus, the textual analysis has been focused exclusively on
defining the term “tribunal.”150
145. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2020); Abdul Latif Jameel
Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019).
146. The Fifth Circuit’s decision will not be addressed here because it adopted the Second
Circuit’s holding that the word “tribunal” in section 1782(a) is ambiguous without further explanation.
Republic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 1999) (“As the Second Circuit observed,
however, the meaning of ‘foreign or international tribunal’ is ambiguous and must be construed in light
of the background and purpose of the statute.”). Likewise, the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits’ decisions
will not be analyzed here because they did not run a textual analysis of section 1782(a). See Servotronics,
Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2020); Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A v.
JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc. (Consorcio I), 685 F.3d 987, 993–98 (11th Cir. 2012) vacated Consorcio
Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc. (Consorcio II), 747 F.3d 1262
(11th Cir. 2014).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018).
148. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 496, 477 (1992) and McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991)).
149. For example, ALJ and NBC concerned corporations based in different countries that were
parties to commercial arbitrations held outside of the United States, and they never questioned the
“foreign” or “international” nature of the dispute. ALJ, 939 F.3d at 722 (Saudi and United States
corporations in arbitration proceedings in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates); NBC, 165 F.3d at 187
(Mexican and United States corporations in arbitration dispute in Mexico). The meaning of the terms
“foreign” and “international” in the context of section 1782(a) raises puzzling questions regarding what
is it that makes an arbitral authority “foreign” or “international”: Is it the nationality of the parties or the
nationality of the arbitrators? Is it the substantive law or the procedural law governing the dispute? Or is
it the law of the seat of the panel? According to Professor Smit, the terms “foreign” and “international”
should be given the broadest possible construction, and a tribunal should be considered international
“when any of the parties before it, or any of the arbitrators, is not a citizen or resident of the United States.”
Smit, American Judicial Assistance, supra note 4, at 485. But see Rothstein, supra note 80, at 78 (“[A]fter
holding that a foreign private arbitration is a [section] 1782 ‘foreign tribunal,’ it would be difficult to
explain why a private international arbitration in the United States is not a [section] 1782 ‘international
tribunal.’”) To the author’s knowledge, only three cases involving section 1782(a) have raised the question
of whether an arbitration conducted in the United States can be considered “foreign of international.” All
three courts rejected to address the issue. See In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14–mc–80277–
JST (DMR), 2015 WL 1815251, at *12 n.9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015) (Miami-based arbitration under the
ICC rules involving non-US parties); In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14-mc-00226-MSK-
KMT, 2015 WL 1810135, at *8 (D. Colo. Apr. 17, 2015) (same); In re Dubey, 949 F. Supp. 2d 990, 995–
96 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (Los Angeles-based arbitration conducted under the American Arbitration
Association involving U.S. parties). Although the meaning of the terms “international” or “foreign” in the
context of section 1782(a) is far from settled, this Note will not address the issue.
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
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For the first step of the inquiry––the ordinary meaning of the word
“tribunal”—courts have sought answers in dictionaries and the common use of
the word in the legal community. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that dictionary
definitions left “room for interpretation,” but found that American jurists,
lawyers, and other courts—including the Supreme Court—have historically and
continuously used “tribunal” to describe private arbitral bodies.151 The Second
Circuit also held that the term “tribunal” does not unambiguously exclude private
arbitration, referring to the parties’ “numerous references to private arbitration
panels as ‘tribunals’ or ‘arbitral tribunals’ in court cases, international treaties,
congressional statements, academic writings, and even the Commentaries of
Blackstone and Story.”152 The Seventh Circuit relied exclusively on dictionary
definitions in its analysis, finding that they are “inconclusive” and “do not
unambiguously resolve” the matter.153
Thus, these courts agreed that the term “tribunal” is broad enough to
include private arbitral authorities. However, this is not enough to conclude that
the term is unambiguous. The next step in the textual inquiry is to determine
whether, in the context of section 1782, the longstanding references to private
arbitrators as tribunals pass muster. Here is where things went wrong for the
Second Circuit.154 Without analyzing the context of the statute, the court held
that the plain meaning of the term “tribunal” in section 1782(a) is ambiguous
because it encompasses many types of arbitrations:
[T]he fact that the term ‘foreign or international tribunals’ is broad enough to include
both [S]tate-sponsored and private tribunals fails to mandate a conclusion that the
term, as used in [section] 1782, does include both. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997) (although term ‘employees’ was broad enough to include
former employees and Congress did not expressly specify ‘current employees’, use
of term in statute was ambiguous). In our view, the term ‘foreign or international
tribunal’ is sufficiently ambiguous that it does not necessarily include or exclude the
arbitral panel at issue here.155
The court’s only support for this conclusion was Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,156 a
Supreme Court case that addressed whether the term “employees” in section
704(a) of title VII includes both former and current employees.157 But the way
in which the Second Circuit paraphrased the holding in Robinson was
151. ALJ, 939 F.3d at 719–20.
152. NBC, 165 F.3d at 188.
153. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2020).
154. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 188.
155. Id.; see also Republic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 888 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the term lacks precision).
156. NBC, 165 F.3d at 188 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)).
157. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat 253, 257 (codified at 42 USC § 2000e-
3(a) (2018)) (“Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement
proceedings. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any
member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”).
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misleading.158 In that case, the Supreme Court’s reasoning directly contradicts
NBC.
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Robinson Court ran a full textual analysis
of section 704(a) of title VII.159 The Court noted that “[a]t first blush, the term
‘employees’ in [section] 704(a) would seem to refer to those having an existing
employment relationship with the employer in question. This initial impression,
however, does not withstand scrutiny in the context of [section] 704(a).”160 Next,
the Court went beyond the language of the text itself and analyzed other uses of
the word “employees” both within section 704(a) and throughout title VII.161 In
the absence of temporal qualifiers that modify the word “employees” (such as
“current” or “former”) the Court held that other sections in title VII covered
current and/or former employees.162 The Court explained that “once it is
established that the term ‘employees’ includes former employees in some
sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and
each section must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a
further meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute.”163
The Court’s reasoning in Robinson applies here, albeit with a different
result than the one reached in NBC. The prima facie meaning of “employees” in
section 704(a) is current employees.164 Similarly, the prima facie meaning of
“tribunal” in section 1782(a) is an impartial adjudicative body that includes both
private and State-sponsored arbitrations—as acknowledged by the Second,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.165 A crucial distinction, however, is that the ordinary
meaning of the words in both statutes runs in opposite directions: “employees”
in section 704(a) is restrictive (former employees would normally be excluded
from the term), while “tribunal” in section 1782(a) is inclusive (encompassing
all types of arbitral authorities).166 This brings us to the ultimate question of
whether the context of the statutes hints at an understanding different from the
terms’ prima facie meaning. In Robinson, other provisions in title VII allowed
for an alternative, more expansive interpretation of the word “employee” that
included former employees.167 Unlike the Second Circuit’s paraphrasing of the
Robinson holding, the word “employee” is not ambiguous because “the term is
broad and Congress did not expressly specify ‘current employees.’”168 Rather,
158. See supra text accompanying note 155.
159. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341–45.
160. Id. at 341. (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 341–45.
162. Id. at 343–44.
163. Id.; see also Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710, 722 (6th
Cir. 2019) (“[I]f the overall context and structure of the statute indicate that Congress used the word in a
different sense than its linguistic meaning, the congressional meaning controls.”).
164. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
165. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2020); ALJ, 939 F.3d
at 719–20; Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (NBC), 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999).
166. Compare Servotronics, 975 F.3d at 693–94 (analyzing dictionary definitions of the word
“tribunal”), and ALJ, 939 F.3d at 719–20 (analyzing dictionary definitions and other uses of the word
“tribunal” in legal practice), and NBC, 165 F.3d at 188 (same), with Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341–45 (noting
that the term “employees” seems to refer to a current employment relationship).
167. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342–44.
168. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 188 (citing Robinson, 519 U.S. 337). The Second Circuit’s depiction
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the ambiguity arises from the context of the statute, not from the meaning of the
word itself.169
But the context of section 1782(a) does not support an interpretation that
restricts the wide-ranging meaning of the term “tribunal.”170 Here, it is proper to
refer to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in ALJ and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Servotronics.171 Unlike the Second Circuit, these courts engaged in a detailed
analysis of other uses of the word in the statute, even though they reached
different conclusions.172 In their textual showdown, the Sixth Circuit’s holding
that the word “tribunal” unambiguously includes private arbitration gained the
upper hand.173
In the specific context of section 1782(a), the word “tribunal” is used three
times.174 First, in the main sentence authorizing district courts to order a person
to give testimony or provide evidence “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal.”175 The next sentence states that “[t]he order may be
pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international
tribunal . . . .”176 Finally, two sentences later, the statute provides that the court’s
order “may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part
the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal . .
. .”177
According to the Seventh Circuit, the last phrase suggests that a “tribunal”
is State-sponsored because it “operat[es] pursuant to the foreign country’s
‘practice and procedure.’”178 Nevertheless, the court conveniently omitted the
fact that the phrase “practice and procedure” also modifies “international
tribunal.”179 Indeed, the drafters’ use of the preposition “or” evinces their intent
to place international tribunals in a different and separate category from
of the word “employees” as a “broad” word is inaccurate, see id., given that the Robinson Court itself
reasoned that the term “would seem to refer to those having an existing employment relationship with the
employer in question.” See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341. That is, the word’s ordinary meaning is not broad
but restrictive. See id.
169. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341–45.
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2018).
171. See Servotronics, 975 F.3d 689; ALJ, 939 F.3d 710.
172. Compare NBC, 165 F.3d at 188, with Servotronics, 975 F.3d at 694–95, and ALJ, 939 F.3d
at 722–23.
173. See ALJ, 939 F.3d at 723.
174. Section 1782(a) states in relevant part: “The district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other
thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations
conducted before formal accusation. The order may bemade pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request
made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may
direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a
person appointed by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to administer
any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and
procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the
international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing.”




178. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2020).
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
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governmental authorities of foreign countries.180 That is, they understood that
international tribunals can exist independently from domestic legal frameworks.
And given that private arbitration bodies may prescribe evidence-gathering
procedures,181 the use of the word “tribunal” in this context is not restrictive.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the permissive wording of the
sentence—“may be in whole or part”—indicates that it “is an optional borrowing
provision.”182 The sentence only suggests that, if the international tribunal does
not have procedures in place, the district court may still grant discovery pursuant
to domestic procedures:
The most that could be said of the sentence is that it may be read to assume that a
foreign country or international tribunal will have evidence-gathering procedures
governing any given proceeding. But the statute’s terms do not require that such
procedures exist or that a “foreign tribunal” be a governmental entity of a country
that has prescribed such procedures.183
With regards to the broader context of the provision, there are two other sections
in title 28 that use the word “tribunal,” which were enacted in the same legislative
act that included section 1782(a).184 Section 1781 deals with the transmittal of
“a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal”
to a “tribunal, officer, or agency in the United States . . . .”185 Section 1696(a)
states that the district court “may order service upon [a person] of any document
issued in connection with a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”186
The Seventh Circuit held that “[s]ervice-of-process assistance and letters
rogatory––governed by [sections] 1696 and 1781––are matters of comity
between governments, which suggests that the phrase ‘foreign or international
tribunal’ as used in this statutory scheme means [S]tate-sponsored tribunals and
does not include private arbitration panels.”187 This conclusion is flawed.
Regarding section 1781, the Seventh Circuit, once again, conveniently left out a
crucial portion of the text of the statute in its analysis. The provision refers to “a
letter rogatory issued or request made . . . .”188 The inclusion of the word
“request” in the statutory language suggests that the drafters were well aware
that letters rogatory were not the only means available for international tribunals
to require assistance from courts in the United States.189 This is relevant because,
as the Sixth Circuit held, private arbitral bodies “can make a request for
180. See id.
181. Strong,Distinguishing Commercial and Investment Arbitration, supra note 52, at 124 (“The
types of procedures that can be used in international commercial arbitration are as diverse as the disputes
themselves, and arbitral tribunals are encouraged to tailor the procedures to meet the needs of individual
parties and the dispute at hand.”).
182. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)).
183. Id.
184. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, sec. 9, §§ 4, 9, 78 Stat. 995, 995 (codified as 28
U.S.C. §§ 1696, 1781 (2018)).
185. 28 U.S.C § 1781.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1696.
187. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2020).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (emphasis added).
189. See id.
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evidence,” which means that section 1781 “does not indicate that the word
‘tribunal’ in the statute refers only to judicial or other public entities.”190
As to section 1696, it would seem at first that it applies only in the context
of governmental entities because arbitral bodies cannot issue service-of-process
requests.191 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Intel rejected a similar
argument.192 There, the petitioner argued that the class of private parties
qualifying as “interested persons” under section 1696 had to be limited to
litigants because “private parties––unlike officials designated under foreign law–
–cannot serve ‘process’ unless they have filed suit.”193 The Court disregarded
the petitioner’s claim and held that the provision “is not limited to service of
process; it allows service of ‘any document’ issued in connection with a foreign
proceeding.”194 Given that private arbitrators can also issue requests to courts for
service of any document to the parties, the meaning of the word “tribunal” in
section 1696 is not limited to State-sponsored entities.195 The Seventh Circuit’s
textual analysis was thus erroneous.
It is still surprising that it took twenty-one years for courts of appeals to
engage in a significant textual inquiry of the statute. As held by the Sixth Circuit,
section 1782(a) provides a “clear answer” to the question presented: both the
plain meaning and the context of the provision lead to the conclusion that the
word “tribunal” unambiguously includes international commercial arbitration.196
V. MAKING SENSE OF THE POST-INTELCHAOS
The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Intel transformed section 1782(a)’s
landscape.197 Although the Court addressed the meaning of the word “tribunal”
in reference to a State-sponsored rather than a private entity,198 its analysis
provided important guidelines to interpret the statute. After Intel, circuit and
district courts have split on whether the Court’s decision warrants including
international private arbitration within the scope of section 1782(a).
A. The Supreme Court Decision in Intel
In Intel, the respondent filed an antitrust complaint against the petitioner
with the Directorate-General for Competition (“DG–Competition”) of the
Commission of the European Communities (“EU Commission”).199 The
respondent later filed a section 1782(a) application in a federal district court to
190. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018)).
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1696.
192. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 2478–79 n.10 (2004).
193. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Intel, 542 U.S. 241 (No. 02-572).
194. Intel, 542 U.S. at 2478–79 n.10.
195. See 28 U.S.C. 1696.
196. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710, 723 (6th Cir. 2019).
197. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 257–58.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 250.
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compel document production related to the DG–Competition proceedings.200
The case reached the Supreme Court, which held that the EU Commission was
a “tribunal” pursuant to section 1782(a).201
Relevant to the Court’s analysis was the function of the DG–Competition
and the EU Commission in the antitrust proceedings.202 The EU Commission is
the executive and administrative organ of the European Communities under the
European Union treaty.203 The EU Commission enforces antitrust law through
one of its investigative departments, the DG–Competition.204 The DG–
Competition conducts a preliminary investigation sua sponte or upon receipt of
a complaint.205 If the DG–Competition decides not to pursue the complaint, this
decision is subject to judicial review by the General Court, and ultimately by the
European Court of Justice.206 If, instead, the DG–Competition decides to pursue
the complaint, the target of the investigation is entitled to a hearing before an
independent officer, who later provides a report to the DG–Competition.207
Based on that report, the DG–Competition provides a recommendation to the EU
Commission, which may either dismiss the complaint or impose penalties.208
The EU Commission’s final action is subject to review in the General Court and
the European Court of Justice.209
The Supreme Court relied on the legislative history of section 1782210 and
on an analysis of the EU Commission’s functions211 to hold that the EU
Commission is a “tribunal” under section 1782(a).212 The Court “reject[ed] the
categorical limitations [the petitioner] would place on the statute’s reach.”213 In
doing so, it emphasized Congress’s instructions to the Commission in 1958 to
recommend procedural revisions “for the rendering of assistance to foreign
courts and quasi-judicial agencies.”214 Similarly, the Court highlighted the fact
that the 1964 amendments to section 1782(a) eliminated the phrase “judicial
proceedings in any court” and replaced it with “a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal.”215 The Court quoted the congressional reports for the
proposition that the word “tribunal” was used to extend assistance “in connection
200. Id. at 251.
201. Id. at 257–58.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 254.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. Prior to the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the General Court was known as
the “Court of First Instance” and the European Court of Justice was known as the “Court of Justice of
European Union.” Given that Intelwas decided in 2004, the decision references the European courts using
their old denominations.
207. Id. at 254–55.
208. Id. at 255.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 241, 247–49, 257–58.
211. Id. at 257–58.
212. Id. at 258.
213. Id. at 255.
214. Id. at 257–58 (quoting Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743, 1743)
(emphasis removed).
215. Id. at 258 (quoting Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 9, 78 Stat. 995, 995).
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with [administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings abroad].”216 Immediately
following this quote, the Court quoted a 1965 article by Professor Smit in
parentheticals, in which he listed adjudicative bodies he considered to be
tribunals under the statute, including “arbitral tribunals . . . .”217
The Court also addressed the issue of whether the DG–Competition and
the EU Commission act as a “tribunal” for purposes of section 1782(a).218 In
evaluating the functions of the EU Commission, the Court noted that it acts as a
first-instance adjudicative decisionmaker;219 it permits the gathering and
submission of evidence in the hearing before the DG–Competition;220 it has the
authority to determine liability and impose penalties;221 and its decisions are
subject to judicial review by the General Court and the European Court of
Justice.222 Although several courts have categorized this as a functional test,
other courts have been wary of this labeling, arguing that “[t]he [Intel] opinion
does not purport to establish a test for future cases.”223
B. Categorizing Post-Intel Decisions
Far from clarifying whether section 1782(a) extends to private arbitration,
Intel led to a deeper split among circuit and district courts. Many of the post-
Intel decisions have misunderstood the nature of international law, have followed
flawed precedent, and have confused similar but logically different arguments.
As a result, courts and practitioners continue to cite to cases that, in reality, do
not support their claims. This section will attempt to categorize over thirty-five
circuit and district court decisions with the purpose of systematizing this
confusing legal framework.
The courts’ holdings will be placed in two main categories: (1) section
1782(a) applies to international commercial arbitration; and (2) section 1782(a)
does not apply to international commercial arbitration. Each category will be
further divided into subcategories.
A few important caveats before proceeding. Some courts have based their
rationales on various arguments, which has resulted in their decisions being
placed in different subcategories simultaneously. Similarly, given that the
courts’ reasonings touch on the textual, historical, and policy considerations
previously discussed, Parts II–IV will be constantly referred to.
216. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7–8 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782,
3788).
217. Id. (quoting Smit, International Litigation, supra note 27, at 1026–27). This quotation
prompted endless discussions among lower courts. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
218. Id. at 257–58.
219. Id. at 246, 255, 258.
220. Id. at 257 (noting that the EU Commission is a “proof-taking” body).
221. Id. at 255 n.9.
222. Id. at 254, 257–58.
223. Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp. (ALJ), 939 F.3d 710, 731 n.11 (6th Cir.
2019).
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1. Section 1782(a) Applies to International Commercial Arbitration
Courts that extended section 1782(a) to private arbitration have based their
decisions on the following rationales: (a) section 1782(a) categorically includes
private arbitral bodies; and (b) private arbitral bodies act like a “tribunal.” Courts
that extended section 1782(a) to private arbitration without providing any
justification were not included in any of the two groups.224 Courts that did not
elaborate on their reasoning but cited a prior court’s holding as support for their
decision will be placed in that court’s category.
a. Section 1782(a) Categorically Includes Private
Arbitral Bodies
Within this category, only a few courts held that the word “tribunal”
unambiguously includes private arbitral panels.225 The Sixth Circuit was the only
court to explore the text of the statute in depth, as explained in Part IV.226
Most courts belonging to this category focused instead on Intel’s broad
reading of the statute’s legislative history.227 First, they tracked Intel’s emphasis
on the twin aims of the provision and on how Congress eliminated the word
“court” in section 1782(a) and replaced it with “tribunal.” Second, they
highlighted Intel’s repeated refusal to place “categorical limitations” on section
1782(a).228 Finally, they emphasized Intel’s quotation of Professor Smit’s 1965
article, which included the phrase “arbitral tribunals.”229 According to these
courts, the Supreme Court cited Professor Smit with approval, which “offers a
meaningful insight”230 into the Court’s understanding of the statute. Many of the
courts in this group also rebutted the policy concerns raised in NBC, which were
discussed in Part III.
224. See e.g., In re CA Inv. (Brazil) S.A., No. 19-mc-22 (MJD/SER), 2019 WL 1531268, at *3
(D. Minn. Apr. 9, 2019) (holding section 1782 applied to an ICC arbitration in Brazil but citing Intel only
for its holding concerning the phrase “interested person” in the statute); In re Technostroyexport, 853 F.
Supp. 695, 697–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a private arbitral panel was a “tribunal” without
elaborating on its reasoning but rejecting the application on discretionary grounds).
225. See ALJ, 939 F.3d at 725; In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225–26 (N.D. Ga.
2006); see also In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting that the term
“tribunal” is commonly used to describe arbitral bodies, but stopping short of holding that the term is
unambiguous); In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (D. Minn. 2007) (same).
226. ALJ, 939 F.3d at 717–23. Despite holding that there was no need to resort to the legislative
history because the text provided a “clear answer,” id. at 723, the Sixth Circuit still addressed the policy
considerations and the statute’s legislative history, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel. Id. at
723–31.
227. See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 212–13 (4th Cir. 2020); Consorcio
Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc. (Consorcio I), 685 F.3d 987,
993–98 (11th Cir. 2012) vacated Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding
(USA), Inc. (Consorcio II), 747 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014).; In re Babcock Borsig AG, 538 F. Supp. 2d
at 239–40; In re Hallmark Capital, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 955–56; In re Roz Trading, 469 F. Supp. 2d at
1224–26; see also ALJ, 939 F.3d at 727–28 (discussing NBC’s analysis of section 1782’s legislative
history and concluding it was erroneous); Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica del Río Lempa v. Nejapa
Power Co., No. 08-135-GMS, 2008 WL 4809035, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 14, 2008) (relying on Intel without
providing further reasoning).
228. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 250 (2004).
229. See id. at 258.
230. In re Babcock Borsig AG, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
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Although these courts acknowledged that Intel did not address private
arbitration, they reasoned that Intel’s interpretation of section 1782(a)’s
legislative history materially impacted NBC’s holding because it became evident
that the Supreme Court favored a broad reading of the statute and rejected
inflexible rules.231
b. Private Arbitral Bodies Act like a “Tribunal”
In addition to Intel’s interpretation of the statute’s legislative history,
several courts have applied Intel’s functional approach. Two distinct
subcategories can be found here:
Section 1782(a) applies to private arbitral bodies if, as a whole, they act
like a “tribunal”: The first subcategory of decisions interpreted Intel to require a
holistic analysis of the functions of a “tribunal.”232 These courts held that private
arbitral authorities are tribunals because they adjudicate disputes, have an
obligation to impartially apply the law to the facts, have authority to enter awards
eventually enforceable in domestic courts, have evidence-gathering capabilities,
and are first-instance decisionmakers.233
Section 1782(a) applies to private arbitral bodies that issue awards subject
to substantive review by national courts: The second subcategory of decisions
also followed Intel’s functional approach. Nevertheless, instead of holistically
analyzing whether arbitrators act like tribunals, they held that judicial review of
the substance of the award was a sine qua non requirement without which the
arbitration falls outside the scope of section 1782(a).234 This interpretation draws
from the Supreme Court’s holding that “the [EU] Commission is a [section]
1782(a) ‘tribunal’ when it acts as a first-instance decisionmaker.”235 Under this
view, the EU Commission in Intel was a “tribunal” primarily because its
decisions were reviewable by the General Court and the European Court of
231. See e.g., In re Roz Trading, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (“The Supreme Court’s interpretation
and application of the legislative history contradicts the interpretations and applications of the Second and
Fifth Circuits . . . .”).
232. See cases cited supra note 227. Most cases in this subcategory relied both on Intel’s
interpretation of the statute’s legislative history and on a functional analysis, with the exception of
Servotronics, 954 F.3d 209 at 212–13, and In re Hallmark Capital, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 955–56, neither of
which applied a functional analysis.
233. See cases cited supra note 227
234. In re Children’s Invest. Fund. Found., 363 F. Supp. 3d 361, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); In re
Pola Mar. Ltd., No. CV416-333, 2018 WL 1787181, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2018); Kleimar N.V. v.
Benxi Iron & Steel Am. Ltd., No. 17-cv-01287, 2017 WL 3386115, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017); In
re Kleimar N.V., 220 F. Supp. 3d 517, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Owl Shipping, LLC, No. 14–5655
(AET)(DEA), 2014 WL 5320192, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2014); In re Winning (HK) Shipping Co., No.
09–22659–MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *9–10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2010); OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky
Petroleum Corp., No. 3:09–mc–265(JBA), 2009 WL 2877156, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2009). The
seminal case in this subgroup is In re Winning, 2010 WL 1796579 (all the other courts adopted the In re
Winning rationale, with the exception of OJSC Ukrnafta, which was decided a year before). Concededly,
this subgroup does not entirely fit within the broader umbrella of “Section 1782(a) applies to international
commercial arbitration.” Technically, these decisions stand for the proposition that section 1782(a) applies
to some arbitrations––those that meet the specific requirement of issuing arbitral awards reviewable on
the merits. However, given that they also apply Intel’s functional approach, they are placed within this
subgroup for purposes of clarity.
235. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004).
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Justice.236 The courts in this subgroup concluded that judicial review bears more
weight in the functional analysis than any other court-like trait in arbitrations.
These decisions have a distinctive common feature that played a key role
in the courts’ reasoning: they all involved section 1782(a) applications for use in
arbitrations in England.237 Pursuant to section 68 of the Arbitration Act of the
United Kingdom (U.K.) parties may challenge an arbitration award in courts on
the basis of a serious procedural irregularity.238 Similarly, section 69 of the Act
states that “[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral
proceedings may . . . appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of an
award made in the proceedings.”239 The courts in this subgroup read this
provision to mean that all arbitration awards in England are subject to review
“on both substantive and procedural grounds,”240 unless the parties waive their
right to appeal.
The U.K.’s distinct legal framework allowed the courts to hold that Intel is
not at odds with NBC. The argument goes as follows: Intel’s functional approach
requires tribunals to be first-instance decisionmakers and NBC requires tribunals
to be State-sponsored; thus, arbitrations in the U.K. fall within the purview of
section 1782(a) only because their awards are subject to review on questions of
law by U.K. courts.241 The Fourth Circuit properly summarized this rationale
when it noted that, since the U.K Arbitration Act is a “product of ‘government-
conferred authority,’” arbitrators in the U.K. are “acting with the authority of the
State” because they issue appealable awards.242At this point, it becomes
necessary to clarify some basic aspects about the enforceability of arbitral
awards.
The seat of an arbitration or the country under whose laws the award is
issued has primary jurisdiction over the arbitration, which translates into the
authority to vacate the arbitral award.243 Courts that have secondary jurisdiction
over the arbitration are limited to denying recognition and enforcement of the
award, but cannot vacate it.244 Different standards and procedures apply
depending on whether courts are setting aside an award or refusing to recognize
and enforce it.245 Increasingly, countries have enacted legislation according to
which the grounds for vacating domestic arbitration awards mirror the grounds
236. See id. at 246, 258.
237. See cases cited supra note 234.
238. Arbitration Act of 1993, c. 23, § 68 (Eng.).
239. Id. § 69.
240. In reWinning (HK) Shipping Co., No. 09–22659–MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *9 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 30, 2010).
241. See e.g., id. at 7, 9 (“[t]he undersigned concurs that the holding in Intel does not necessarily
extend the reach of section 1782 to purely private arbitrations . . . . the holding in Biedermann and NBC
are fully consistent with the Intel decision . . . .”).
242. Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 2020). The Fourth Circuit did
not base its holding exclusively on the judicial review requirement. Id. The court, however, did reconcile
NBC with Intel by holding that even if it were to apply the restrictive holding in NBC—“that the term
refers only to ‘entities acting with the authority of the States’”––the U.K. arbitration would meet that
definition. Id.
243. Strong, Navigating the Borders, supra note 58, at 187.
244. Id.
245. Id.
2021] Debunking the Myths 185
for non-enforcement of a foreign award under the New York Convention.246
Article V of the New York Convention allows member parties to refuse
recognition and enforcement of an award based on two narrow grounds:
jurisdictional and procedural challenges.247 A jurisdictional challenge concerns
arbitral awards that go beyond the scope of the submission of the arbitration.248
A procedural challenge concerns serious irregularities that affect the decision-
making process in the arbitration, such as incapacity of the parties, invalidity of
the arbitration agreement, lack of notice, procedural unfairness, awards that are
not yet binding on the parties, and awards that were set aside in the country it
was issued.249 Notably, Article V of the New York Convention does not allow
for substantive review of the award, which falls in line with the expectation of
parties to international arbitrations—legal certainty and a rapid resolution of the
dispute by way of limited judicial review.250
Although uncommon, some countries have additional or different grounds
for vacatur of domestic arbitral awards other than jurisdictional or procedural
grounds. This is the case of the U.K., which allows for substantive challenges to
domestic arbitral awards on questions of law.251 Note that this substantive review
is technically not a review on the merits of the award because the arbitral
authority’s factual determinations are not subject to reconsideration.
The differing interpretations of Intel’s functional approach turn on the
meaning of the Court’s phrase “first-instance decisionmaker.”252 On the one
hand, the courts in the first subgroup, which read section 1782(a) broadly, held
that first-instance decisionmakers are impartial adjudicative bodies that gather
evidence, apply the law to the facts, and issue enforceable decisions reviewable
by domestic courts.253 Of emphasis here, they understood Intel’s language
concerning judicial review as requiring only limited review––on grounds similar
to those set forth in Article V of the New York Convention.254 These holdings
are in harmony with the purpose of section 1782(a), which is to provide judicial
assistance to tribunals that are functionally equivalent to conventional courts, as
explained in Part II.
On the other hand, the courts in the second subgroup only granted judicial
assistance under section 1782(a) because the arbitrations rendered awards
reviewable by English courts on questions of law.255 In other words, according
246. Id.
247. New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V.
248. Id., art. V(d).
249. Id.
250. Strong, Navigating the Borders, supra note 58, at 126.
251. It is important to highlight that the Arbitration Act of the U.K. does not apply to foreign
awards, but only to those arbitrations taking place in the U.K. or in which U.K. law controls the underlying
dispute. Arbitration Act of 1993, c. 23, § 2 (Eng.)
252. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255, 258 (2004).
253. See cases cited supra note 227.
254. See e.g., Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc.
(Consorcio I), 685 F.3d 987, 993–98 (11th Cir. 2012) vacated Consorcio Ecuatoriano de
Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc. (Consorcio II), 747 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014).
255. See cases cited supra note 234; see e.g., In reWinning (HK) Shipping Co., No. 09–22659–
MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2010) (“[T]he undersigned is constrained by the
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to these decisions, the statute does not apply to the vast majority of international
commercial arbitrations. This rationale is deeply flawed and rests on an
erroneous interpretation of the “first-instance decisionmaker” language in
Intel.256
The fact that a tribunal acts in the first instance only compels the conclusion
that there is a second instance of review; it does not qualify the extent to which
the award must be reviewed. Stated differently, limited review does not mean no
review at all.257 Thus, international commercial arbitrators are first-instance
decisionmakers because they issue awards that are reviewable on procedural and
jurisdictional grounds.258 The Eleventh Circuit emphatically rejected the notion
that arbitral awards had to be subject to substantive review:
One could not seriously argue that, because domestic arbitration awards are only
reviewable in court for limited reasons (notably excluding a second look at the
substance of the arbitral determination), this amounts to no judicial review at all . . .
. we can discern no sound reason to depart from the common sense understanding
that an arbitral award is subject to judicial review when a court can enforce the award
or can upset it on the basis of defects in the arbitration proceeding or in other limited
circumstances.259
The courts in this subgroup did not provide arguments to explain why requiring
substantive review of arbitral awards would enhance the purpose of section
1782(a). This reasoning raises the implicit claim that arbitral awards are
unreliable and that their enforcement should not proceed without a “true
judiciary power”260 reviewing the substance of the award—despite the fact that,
in part, parties seek arbitration precisely to avoid judicial review on the merits.
This goes back to the point discussed in Part II, according to which the only
reason why Congress would have limited section 1782(a) exclusively to State-
sponsored bodies—or to arbitrations that issue awards subject to review on the
merits by a domestic court—is that it allegedly mistrusts arbitrators. But as
explained throughout the Note, this stance runs contrary to the spirit of the FAA
and the New York Convention, to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration,
and to Congress’s intent to liberalize judicial assistance in international
proceedings.
The logical gap in this approach becomes evident in the context of
Supreme Court’s ruling in Intel which does, in fact, place great emphasis on the availability of judicial
review of the decision of the dispute forum . . . . the undersigned has found no case which expressly
addressed the issue of judicial reviewability and held that where a decision by a dispute resolution body
was reviewable by a court on both substantive and procedural grounds, that body was not an international
tribunal under section 1782.” (emphasis added)).
256. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 255, 258.
257. Consorcio I, 685 F.3d at 996.
258. Even assuming that Intel required substantive review of arbitral awards, it is not even clear
what type of substantive review would be appropriate. In Intel, the General Court and the European Court
of Justice could review the record before the Commission and, presumably, reevaluate the Commission’s
factual determinations. 542 U.S. at 254. Conversely, review under section 68 of the Arbitration Act of the
U.K. is limited to questions of law, which could also be considered a limited judicial review similar to
that of Article V of the New York Convention.
259. Consorcio I, 685 F.3d at 997–98 (emphasis added).
260. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d
481, 485 (S.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d sub nom. El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio
Lempa, 341 F. App’x 31 (5th Cir. 2009).
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international investment arbitrations. In a uniform manner, district courts have
held that section 1782(a) is applicable to investment arbitration disputes because
the arbitrators’ source of authority is a multilateral or bilateral treaty.261 If NBC’s
rationale is followed to its core, however, investment arbitrations bring to life all
the supposed reasons why section 1782(a) should exclude private arbitrations:
an award not reviewable on the merits by an arbitral authority that is not part of
a judiciary, in a process that is not overseen by a State. This approach finds no
support in the language of section 1782(a) or in the statute’s legislative history.
Interestingly, several courts that have refused to apply section 1782(a) to
private arbitrations have relied on the opinions referred to above––i.e., on those
that included investment arbitrations within the scope of the statute because the
arbitrations were State-sponsored. One of the most often-cited decisions has been
In re Oxus Gold, which addressed section 1782(a) in the context of an
international investment arbitration.262 The court held:
The international arbitration at issue is being conducted by the United Nations
Commission on International Law, a body operating under the United Nations and
established by its member [S]tates. The arbitration is not the result of a contract or
agreement between private parties as in National Broadcasting. The proceedings in
issue has [sic] been authorized by the sovereign [S]tates of the United Kingdom and
the Kyrgyzstan Republic for the purpose of adjudicating disputes under the Bilateral
Investment Treaty. Therefore, it appears to the Court as if the international arbitration
proceeding in the present case is included as a “foreign or international tribunal” in
[s]ection 1782.263
Although this decision has had a strong precedential value,264 it contains several
legal and factual errors as pointed out in detail by Professor S.I. Strong: (a) the
court’s suggestion that the United Nations Commission on International Law
(“UNCITRAL”) is involved in the administration of investment arbitrations is
flawed.265 Although UNCITRAL developed the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
which are used in investment arbitration, neither the United Nations nor
UNCITRAL administer the proceedings,266 which means that the arbitrator that
actually handles the proceedings is not State-sponsored;267 (b) the court assumed
that only treaty-based arbitrations proceed under UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules.268 These rules, however, can be used in both public and private
proceedings;269 and (c) some courts suggested that the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules constitute a type of international law that can transform an arbitration
261. See Roger P. Alford, Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 127,
136 (2012) (“[F]ederal courts uniformly agree that an arbitral tribunal established pursuant to a bilateral
investment treaty constitutes an ‘international tribunal’ within the meaning of the statute.”).
262. In re Oxus Gold PLC, No. MISC. 06–82, 2006 WL 2927615, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006).
263. Id. at *5. (citations omitted).
264. See e.g., El Paso Corp., 341 F. App’x. at 32; In re Dubey, 949 F. Supp. 2d 990, 994 (C.D.
Cal. 2013); In re Winning (HK) Shipping Co., No. 09–22659–MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 30, 2010); In re Norfolk S. Corp., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2009); OJSC Ukrnafta v.
Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., No. 3:09–mc–265(JBA), 2009 WL 2877156, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2009).
265. Strong, Distinguishing Commercial and Investment Arbitration, supra note 52, at 307–308.
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panel into a tribunal for purposes of section 1782.270 This assertion does not hold
up to scrutiny. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules “do not constitute
‘international law’ any more than the rules of a private arbitral institution” do.271
Such an approach would likewise suggest that “the nature of the underlying
substantive or procedural law should determine the nature of the tribunal.”272
These critiques demonstrate not only the confusion among courts between
the function and the source of authority of a tribunal, but also their
misunderstanding of fundamental aspects of international law, which has led
them to perpetuate the myth of State sponsorship.
At first, it seems as if the decisions in this subgroup expanded the scope of
section 1782(a) because they held that some private arbitral bodies can be
considered tribunals under the statute, but a closer examination reveals that their
reasoning is flawed. FollowingNBC, these courts erroneously limited the section
1782(a) to State-sponsored tribunals, while simultaneously misinterpreting Intel
to impose a judicial reviewability requirement—exactly the kind of categorical
limitation that the Supreme Court attempted to avoid.273
2. Section 1782(a) Does Not Apply to International Commercial
Arbitration
Courts that have refused to extend section 1782(a) to private arbitration
have based their decisions on the following rationales: (a) section 1782(a)
categorically excludes private arbitration; and (b) private arbitral bodies do not
act like a “tribunal.”
a. Section 1782(a) Categorically Excludes Private
Arbitration
The courts in this group adopted the Second Circuit’s rationale to its full
extent, holding that Intel did not overrule NBC.274 They held that the word
270. Id. at 308–09 (citingOJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., No. 3:09–mc–265(JBA),
2009 WL 2877156, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2009)) (“An arbitration panel governed by international law,
namely, the UNCITRAL rules of arbitration, constitutes a ‘foreign tribunal’ for the purposes of [s]ection
1782.” (citations omitted)).
271. Id. at 309.
272. Id. at 307–309.
273. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 250 (2004).
274. See El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341 F. App’x
31, 33–34 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding Republic of Kaz. v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir.
1999), which in turn adopted the NBC rationale); In re Storag Etzel GmbH, No. 19-mc-209-CFC, 2020
WL 1849714, at *2–3 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2020); In re Golden Root Invs., PTE, No. EDMC 19-11 JGB
(KKx), 2019 WL 8011743 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 6, 2019); In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 393 F. Supp. 3d 376, 384–
86 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2019); Govt. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Bridge Capital LLC, No.
1:15-MC-00018, 2016 WL 1389764, at *4 (D.N. Mar. Is. Apr. 7, 2016); In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal
S.A., No. 14–mc–80277–JST (DMR), 2015 WL 1815251, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015); In re Grupo
Unidos Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14-mc-00226-MSK-KMT, 2015 WL 1810135, at *6 (D. Colo. Apr. 17,
2015); In re Dubey, 949 F. Supp. 2d 990, 993–95 (C.D. Cal. 2013); In re Rhodianyl S.A.S, No. 11-1026-
JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *39–49 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2011); see also In re Oxus Gold PLC,
No. 06–82–GEB, 2007 WL 1037387, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007) (adopting NBC’s rationale without
analyzing Intel). The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC also
categorically excluded private arbitration from the scope of section 1782(a). 975 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir.
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“tribunal” in section 1782(a) is ambiguous, that Congress’s intent was to cover
only State-sponsored tribunals, and that a broader reading of the statute would
adversely affect the efficiency of arbitrations and would lead to a conflict with
domestic law.275
These decisions stress the fact that Intel did not address section 1782(a) in
the context of private arbitration. The courts read Intel’s holding narrowly,
interpreting it to apply exclusively to State-sponsored tribunals because the DG–
Competition and the EU Commission were governmental bodies. Most of the
courts in this subcategory rejected the need to apply Intel’s functional approach
under the theory that it “define[d] the type of governmental arbitration subject to
[section] 1782, rather than covering every type of international tribunal
imaginable.”276 After the Intel decision, the Second and Fifth Circuit issued
decisions reaffirming the holdings in NBC and Biedermann precisely under the
argument that Intel left their rationales unchanged.277
The courts in this subgroup spent considerable energy condemning the
decisions that extended section 1782(a) to private tribunals, criticizing their
reliance on the Intel Court’s parenthetical quotation of Professor Smit’s article
that included the phrase “arbitral tribunals.”278 The critiques are accurate—those
decisions excessively relied on a quotation that was taken out of context.
Nevertheless, this discussion shifts the focus away from the true issue at hand:
none of the courts in this subcategory addressed why a distinction based on the
State-sponsored nature of a tribunal would further section 1782(a)’s purpose. For
the reasons detailed throughout this Note, these courts’ overly narrow reading of
Intel and their reliance on NBC should be rejected.
b. Private Arbitral Bodies Do Not Act like a
“Tribunal”
Although many of the decisions in this group relied on NBC’s rationale,
they also applied Intel’s functional approach.279 In doing so, the courts held that
2020). But it did not fully adopt the NBC holding. In particular, the Seventh Circuit was the only court in
this group to hold that the text of section 1782(a) unambiguously excludes private arbitration because it
only refers to State-sponsored entities. Id. at 695. It thus arrived at the same conclusion as the NBC court
but without diving into the statute’s legislative history. Id. at 694–95. The Seventh Circuit also analyzed
the potential conflict between a broad reading of section 1782(a) and section 7 of the FAA, see id. at 695–
96––an issue first raised by the Second Circuit in NBC, as explained in Part III.
275. See cases cited supra note 274.
276. See In re Govt. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 2016 WL 1389764, at *4; see also
cases cited supra note 274 with the exception of In re Rhodianyl, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, and In
re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387.
277. Hanwei Guo v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 965 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2020); El Paso, 341 F.
App’x 31, 33–34.
278. Four critiques were raised: (i) the context of the quote supports the proposition that section
1782 applies to administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, not that it applies to private proceedings;
(ii) Professor Smit’s phrase “arbitral tribunals” does not refer to private arbitral tribunals but to State-
sponsored arbitral tribunals, which fall under the NBC holding; (iii) the Court omitted part of Professor
Smit’s definition of “tribunal” that included “all bodies exercising adjudicatory powers,” which could be
interpreted as supporting the Court’s exclusion of private arbitration; and (iv) the Court did not adopt
Professor Smit’s statements as its own and it would not have expanded the scope of section 1782(a) to
private arbitration without discussing doing so expressly. See cases cited supra note 274.
279. See In re Finserve Grp. Ltd, No. CA 4:11-mc-2044-RBH, 2011 WL 5024264, at *3 (D.S.C.
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private arbitral bodies did not act like a “tribunal” under section 1782(a) because
arbitral awards are not subject to judicial review on the merits by a State-
sponsored court.280 As discussed at length in Section V.B.1.b, this reasoning is
flawed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The circuit split has brought a great deal of uncertainty and inconvenience
for practitioners seeking section 1782(a) applications for use in international
commercial arbitrations. The Second Circuit’s decision at the turn of the last
century paved the way for an unjustifiably narrow reading of the statute that
excluded private arbitration bodies from the scope of section 1782(a). Other
courts of appeals, such as the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, have recently picked up
on NBC’s flaws. In holding that international commercial arbitrators are
“tribunal[s]” under section 1782(a), these courts gave justice to the plain
meaning of the text of the provision; redeemed Professor Smit’s choice to use a
broad and neutral term capable of encompassing all adjudicative bodies; and
promoted the policy goals intended by Congress when it enacted the statute in
1964. It will be in the hands of the Supreme Court to settle the question and to
decide whether to uphold the goal of liberalized judicial assistance to all
international tribunals as envisioned by the drafters of section 1782.
Oct. 20, 2011); In re Norfolk S. Corp., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885–86 (N.D. Ill. 2009); In re Operadora DB
Mexico, S.A. de C.V., No. 6:09-cv-383-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 2423138, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009);
La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (S.D.
Tex. 2008), aff’d sub nom. El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341
F. App’x 31, 33–34 (5th Cir. 2009)
280. See cases listed supra note 279.
